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INTRODUCTION 
Paul Lichtefeld ("Lichtefeld"), by and through his 
counsel of record, Morgan, Scalley & Reading, submits this reply 
brief concerning issues which have been raised by his filing of 
this appeal. Lichtefeld directs his reply brief specifically to 
arguments concerning the Utah Constitution's open court provision 
and equal protection of the laws. Lichtefeld submits that the 
other issues raised in his appeal have been adequately briefed to 
the court and that following oral argument, the court will be in 
a position to render a decision thereon. However, Lichtefeld 
suggests that any one of the issues raised, as outlined below, 
establishes sufficient grounds for reversal of the District 
Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the Utah Architects' and Builders' Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 by depriving plaintiff equal 
protection of laws? 
2. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate 
the Utah Const, art. I, § 2 and art. I, § 24 by depriving 
plaintiff equal protection of laws? 
1 
3. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 by depriving plaintiff access to courts 
and redress of injuries? 
4. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended), violate 
the Utah Const. Art. VI, § 26 forbidding special laws or 
legislation? 
5. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 requiring that only one subject be 
clearly expressed in the Statutory Title? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OPEN COURT PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND THIS COURT'S RULING IN BERRY 
V. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP.. MANDATE A FINDING 
THAT THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF 
REPOSE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Both the appellant and respondents clearly agree that 
this court's opinion in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc. 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), established the criteria for judging 
constitutionality of statutes of repose under the Utah Const. 
art. 1, § 11, commonly referred to as the "open court 
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provision". (See Appellant's brief at pages 25, 31 and 32; 
Respondent's brief at pages 21 and 23). The great divergence in 
the positions of the parties relates to whether the holding of 
Berry is determinative of the open court issue raised in this 
appeal. The respondents' arguments appear to be three fold, as 
they relate to why the Berry decision is not determinative of the 
open court issue presented here. 
First, the respondents suggested "that there are great 
dissimilarities between the two acts . . . " (Respondent's brief 
at page 3). Presumably, the Smith and Cutshaw argue that the 
statutes of repose themselves, including the architects' and 
contractors' statute contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 and 
that contained in the now unconstitutional Product Liability Act 
at Utah Code Annotated § 78-15 et seq. are dissimilar. It is 
interesting to note that no where, other than in the introductory 
phrase alluded to above, do Cutshaw and Smith elaborate on the 
alleged dissimilarities between the two acts. 
Smith and Cutshaw's second attack suggests that 
Lichtefeld retains an alternative remedy against the original 
owner of the structure, making the facts of this matter 
distinguishable from the facts presented in Berry. 
(Respondents' brief at page 23). 
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Lastly, respondents Smith and Cutshaw argue that the 
architects' and contractors' statute of repose contained at Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 obviates a clear economic evil, justifying 
the arbitrary establishment of a class of defendants with 
complete immunity from actions which accrue after seven years, 
(Respondents' brief at page 24). 
Lichtefeld contends that the holding in the Berry case 
mandates that the architects7 and contractors' statute of repose 
is not distinguishable from the statute of repose created in the 
products liability act and accordingly it must be deemed 
unconstitutional as violative of the open courts constitutional 
provision. Considering the decision in Good v. Christensen. 527 
P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), the court in Berry indicated: 
in sustaining the statute [the 
architects' and contractors' statute of 
repose] the court declined to make any 
analysis of the constitutional claims raised. 
It simply made the conclusionary statement 
that the attack on the "constitutionality of 
the statute . . . [was] without merit." 
(citation omitted). Whether the court in fact 
addressed the merits of Article 1, section 11 
is speculative, and the ruling, therefore, 
has little persuasive effect here. Berry at 
683. 
The Good v. Christensen decision is the only Utah authority upon 
which respondent Smith and Cutshaw can rely in asserting that the 
architects' and contractors' statute of repose is constitutional. 
Lichtefeld's reading of the comment by the court in Berry, quoted 
above, suggests that the court may reconsider its earlier 
position announced in Good v. Christensen, if the Article 1, 
section 11, Open Court Provision were raised in a constitutional 
challenge. 
The constitutional challenge anticipated in Berry of 
the architects' and contractors' statute of repose is presented 
in this case, as well as a case currently pending decision, 
Horton v. Goldminers Daughter v. Cal Gas Corp. v. Buehner 
Concrete Co., Utah Supreme Court, docket No. 870031. Counsel for 
Lichtefeld has reviewed the briefs filed in Horton, and finds the 
arguments submitted by the appellants in said case highly 
persuasive, particularly as they relate to the inter-relation 
between the Berry decision and an attack of unconstitutionality 
based on open access to courts under the Utah Constitution. 
After having heard oral argument in the Horton matter in 
September, the court is fully apprised of the arguments which 
support a finding that the architects7 and contractors7 statute 
of repose is unconstitutional and accordingly those arguments 
need not be raised here at length. For the court's convenience, 
applicable argument raised by the Horton Appellants in their 
reply brief is attached hereto labeled Addendum 1. However, 
there is one important distinction between the Horton case, 
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currently pending decision before the court, and the facts of the 
matter presented here. 
One can envision three classes of plaintiffs who could 
be directly affected by the architects7 and builders' statute of 
repose. One class would include third-parties who were injured 
while on the premises of the owner or occupier of the improved 
real estate. Another class of plaintiffs would include 
subsequent owners or occupiers of the improvement to real estate. 
A third class of plaintiffs would likely include original owners 
of improved real estate who have owned the property since its 
improvement. The Horton case presents a case with a plaintiff 
who falls in the first class. This action, on the other hand, 
presents a case with a plaintiff in the second class of potential 
plaintiffs. Counsel for Lichtefeld is unaware of any case with a 
plaintiff in the third class, which is most problematical as 
members of this third class have no remedy against themselves. 
See Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5 (Second paragraph). 
A. The Products Liability statute of repose and the 
architects7 and contractor's statute of repose are 
similar. 
In spite of the failure by the respondents to identify 
any of the "great dissimilarities" between the statute of repose 
established in the products liability act and that established in 
the architects7 and contractors7 statute of repose, Lichtefeld 
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suggests that there is no practicle difference between the acts 
themselves. The court in Berry when defining the practicle 
effect of the statute of repose in the products liability act 
indicated: 
In the instant case, the legislature has 
imposed less than a total abrogation of all 
remedies for injuries caused by defective 
products since actions are only barred after 
a specified period of time has elapsed. 
Berry at 680. Certainly, the architects' and contractors' 
statute of repose is very similar in that the legislature has 
eliminated all remedies for injuries caused by negligence of 
architects' or contractors' or others as against the protected 
class. 
The statutes are also similar in that they contain 
exceptions to their overall abrogation of substantive rights 
after passage of a certain amount of time. The products 
liability statute of repose lists what specific causes of action 
are barred. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-15-3 (1) (a-e) . It is 
interesting to note that a claim for an unreasonably dangerous 
condition on property is not included in the list of actions that 
are foreclosed after passage of six years. In other words, the 
legislature did leave injured parties with certain remedies, 
assuming they chose to file actions on theories other than those 
enumerated in the statute. A hypothetical it appears to be 
apropos. Assume that a product was manufactured with an 
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unobvious defect. Assume likewise that the product is installed 
on real property (i.e. playground equipment) and that after 
passage of six years, someone is injured as a direct result of 
the manufacturing defect. It is clear that under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-15-3 that an action could be had against the owner 
of the property wherein the playground equipment was installed. 
The architects' and contractors' statute of repose is 
similar in that there is an exception allowing for legal action 
against original owners or subsequent owners and occupiers of the 
land. The greatest disparity between the two statutes of 
repose appears to be that the statute of repose in the products 
liability act contains a six or ten year limitation, while the 
statute of repose relating to the architects and contractors 
contains a seven year limitation. 
B* Lichtefeld has no effective actionable remedy. 
The Berry court concluded, and the respondents agree, 
that the open court provision of the Utah Constitution is 
satisfied 
"if the law provides an injured person an 
ef fec t ive and reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e remedy 
*by due course of law' for v indicat ion of h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . The b e n e f i t 
p r o v i d e d by t h e s u b s t i t u t e must be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y equal in va lue or other 
benef i t to the remedy abrogated in providing 
e s s e n t i a l l y c o m p a r a t i v e s u b s t a n t i v e 
protec t ion to one 's person, property, or 
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reputation although the form of substantive 
remedy may be different." Berry at 680. 
Lichtefeld concedes that if the architects' and contractors' 
statute of repose provided an effective alternative remedy, that 
it would survive constitutional scrutiny under the access to 
court theory. However, as demonstrated below, there is no 
effective alternative remedy provided in the architects' and 
contractors' statute of repose. 
The respondents have boldly asserted at page 2 3 of 
their brief that: 
Lichtefeld in this case has potential causes 
of action against the prior owner of the 
structure and materialmen who are not 
exempted from the operation of § 78-12-25.5. 
Careful analysis reveals that no such causes of action exist. 
Claims against the prior owner would necessarily be for 
breach of contract or misrepresentation. The only relationship 
between the prior owner and the owner of the structure at the 
time damage results is the contractual relation between the 
parties. Considering that the longest statute of limitation for 
an action based on a contract is six years (see Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-23) the statute could have easily run before 
the expiration of the seven year statute of repose. The statute 
of limitations for misrepresentation is substantially shorter, 
though it is tolled until discovery of the misrepresentation. 
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See Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). A claim based on either 
breach of contract or misrepresentation would be premised on the 
prior owner having knowledge of the defect. However, in cases 
such as that now before the court, the defect is latent; no one 
has knowledge of the defect and negligence which caused it until 
the damage occurs. In this case, Lichtefeld's first notice of 
the defect and negligence causing it occurred after the 
statutory period of repose had lapsed. The latent nature of the 
defect precludes any action against the prior owner. 
No alternative successful claim could be made against 
materialmen. Proximate cause analysis, as suggested in the 
report of the forensic engineer contained as Addendum I of the 
appellant's brief, suggests that it was the negligence of the 
contractor and the architect which resulted in the actual damage. 
The building was constructed such that the specified materials 
failed. (See Addendum I, appellant's brief). The architect 
apparently failed to notice the substantial deviance from the 
specifications during his inspections of the cabin. It is true 
that the materials themselves failed and that that failure was 
the cause in fact of any damages. However, clearly the legal 
cause of the damages was the misuse of the materials by the 
contractor and his inappropriate installation of the same. 
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Lichtefeld and others similarly situated have no other 
remedy available once the seven year statute of repose has 
lapsed. If their damages are proximately caused by negligence of 
an architect or contractor a claim that they have an alternative 
remedy against the materialmen is unsupported. Without the 
required alternative remedy as discussed in Berry, the court 
should reject the respondents' argument that there is an 
alternative remedy and the court must conclude that the statute 
is unconstitutional on that basis. 
c
» No rational basis exists between the alleged 
economic evil and the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-25.5. 
The respondents' last theory for having the architects' 
and contractors' statute of repose pass constitutional muster 
relating to open access to courts, is that, in the words of the 
Berry court: 
. . . abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
action may be justified only if there is a 
clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. Berry at 680. 
Two questions are actually presented rather than the single 
question claimed by the respondents. The question is not simply 
whether there is a substantial social or economic evil. The 
inquiry goes on to make a determination and balance between the 
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elimination of an existing legal remedy being a reasonable means 
for achieving the objective. 
The Respondents7 argument here is defective in two 
respects. First, they fail to identify what the clear social or 
economical evil is that must be eliminated. At page 18 of the 
respondents brief, they allege "difficulties of proof frequently 
arising from passage of time." At pages 19 and 2 0 of the 
respondents brief, they allege "a measure of security for 
professionals where liability otherwise might extend into the 
retirement of the individuals and imperpituity for corporations." 
Footnote 3 at page 19 of the Respondents' brief presents the 
hypothetical involving Henry Hobson and his commission to be the 
architect and builder for a church completed in 1887 and a slip 
and fall accident occurring on the steps of the church in 1981. 
An essential flaw in the hypothetical is that the uneven risers 
giving rise to the fall of the plaintiff in the hypothetical were 
not a latent defect. Such a defect appears to be the type that 
an owner occupier of land should be aware of upon reasonable 
inspection. The type of latent defect such as that in the 
Lichtefeld cabin, which was covered by installation, roofing and 
interior finishes, simply does not fall in the same category and 
accordingly the hypothetical should be disregarded by the court. 
Lastly, the respondents appear to believe that encouragement of 
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construction justifies the adoption of this type of a statute of 
repose for contractors and architects. However, as pointed out 
by the Alaska court in Turner Construction Co. v. Scales, 752 
P. 2d 467 (Alaska 1988) the opposite effect is achieved by a 
statute of repose. 
In our view there is no substantial 
relationship between excepting design 
professionals from liability, shifting 
liability for defective design and 
construction to owners and material 
suppliers, and the goal of encouraging 
construction. The shift of liability to 
unprotected parties decreases their incentive 
to build in corresponding measure to the 
increase incentives of protective parties. 
If anything, the disincentive on the part of 
owners may be greater than their potential 
measure of liability shift, because they may 
be liable for a product over which they have 
no control. Moreover, design defects may be 
catastrophic and experimental design shifts 
correspondingly greater unknown risks to 
owners, giving them even more reason to not 
finance construction. Turner at page 472. 
In spite of the attempts by the Respondents to identify 
the economic evils, they fail to specifically point to any 
authoritative legislative intent as established by the Utah 
Legislature upon passage of Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5. 
Lichtefeld submits that the only apparent economic evil is that 
which may be suffered by design professionals and builders as a 
result of their being required to defend actions brought after 
the repose period. If such an economic evil justifies the 
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type of legislation enacted in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5 
then it necessarily follows that similar legislation could be 
passed to protect other professionals in other professions. 
Certainly accountants should be entitled to the same type of 
protection as well as attorneys. However, the supposed economic 
evil fails to consider that the actions of design professionals 
and builders can have catastrophic effects long after a statute 
of repose has run. Certainly, similar legislation could not pass 
constitutional muster if it related to attorneys. The bar, the 
bench and legislators alike all recognize that actions of 
attorneys can have substantial effects long after advise is 
rendered or documents are prepared. Lichtefeld submits that the 
same should be true with design professionals and builders. The 
passage of seven years does not eliminate latent defects that may 
be the direct responsibility of design professionals or builders. 
The second major problem area of the Respondents' 
argument in this regard is that they are never able to 
demonstrate why the classification of design professionals and 
builders is not an arbitrary classification. It clearly is. 
Suppliers of materials to the same building can be responsible 
for damages which occur after the statute of repose runs, while 
those who made the decision to use the specific materials and 
those who installed the materials have no liability after the 
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statutory period of repose, Lichtefeld argues that such a 
classification is clearly arbitrary and accordingly, the 
classification fails to pass the standards announced by this 
court in Berry. 
The court in Berry considered at length the competing 
interest between the access to court provisions of state 
constitutions and decisions by state courts which have found 
statutes of repose to be constitutional. At pages 677 and 678 of 
the opinion reported in the Pacific Reporter Second, Volume 717, 
the court enumerated decisions from other jurisdictions which 
the Utah court found persuasive. Specifically, in the cases 
cited by the court as authority for its decision to rule the 
products liability statute of repose unconstitutional on an 
access to court basis, the court relied on nine decisions from 
eight other jurisdictions which held architects' and builders7 
statutes of repose unconstitutional. Footnote 8 of the Berry 
decision points out that the number of jurisdictions which have 
held statutes of repose unconstitutional now nearly equals those 
jurisdictions who have consistently held repose statutes 
constitutional. 
One must seriously question the "bean counting" 
analysis of the respondents wherein they conclude that the 
majority position, and therefore correct position, is that 
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statutes of repose should be held constitutional. Indeed, 
detailed analysis of addendums 1 and 2 to the respondents7 brief 
reveals several errors. Specifically, Florida is listed both as 
having ruled that a statute of repose is constitutional as well 
as having ruled that the statute of repose is unconstitutional. 
It is interesting to note that the decision cited by the 
respondents suggesting that Florida holds its statute of repose 
constitutional was an appellate court decision and not an opinion 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. Florida's Supreme 
Court's decision in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 
S.2d 572 (Florida 1979) (cited with approval by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Inc.) appears to be the 
definitive position of the Florida court as with respect to its 
architects' and contractors' statute of repose. 
The respondents also list Wisconsin as a state which 
has ruled that its architects' and engineers' statue of repose is 
constitutional. Lichtefeld refers the court to the Wisconsin 
decision of Callas Milwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wise. 2d 
382, 225 N.W. 2d 454 (1975) wherein the architect and 
contractors' statute of repose was specifically declared 
unconstitutional on an equal protection basis. 
To the list of states which have found an architects' 
and contractors' statute of repose unconstitutional, the state of 
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South Dakota must be added. The case of Daugaard v. Baltic 
Cooperative Building Supply Assoc., 349 N.W. 2d 419 (So. Dakota, 
1984), held the architects' and contractors' statute of repose in 
South Dakota unconstitutional as violative of South Dakota's open 
court provision in its constitution. 
Considering this court's review of decisions concluding 
that statutes of repose are unconstitutional is in the Berry case 
and the numerous errors in the Addendums reported by the 
respondents, Lichtefeld suggests that certainly there is no 
"clear weight of authority" which is contra to the positions 
asserted by Lichtefeld. 
POINT II 
THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF 
REPOSE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, 
AS MANDATED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Equal production analysis, whether based on state or 
federal grounds, follows the same analytical process as the 
second step in determining whether a statute violates the open 
court provision as discussed above. Basically, the court must 
consider whether the legislative purpose behind creating the 
architects' and contractors' statute of repose has a rational 
basis to effectuate the stated legislative purposes in creating 
such classifications. 
17 
The Utah court has considered the question of equal 
protection constitutionality of a statute of repose established 
in the Medical Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4 in 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 435 P. 2d 30 (Utah 
1981)• There the court indicated: 
The narrow question presented is whether the 
legislature may constitutionally single out 
the health care profession and provide that 
limitation period be shorter for claims of 
medical malpractice than for other types of 
personal injury claims. 
The test to be applied in making such a 
determination is whether there exists a 
rational basis to treat health care providers 
differently from other alleged tortfeasors. 
Allen at page 31. 
In the Allen case, the court concluded that the statute 
of repose created in the Medical Malpractice Act was not 
violative of equal protection of the laws. The court was able to 
make such a ruling based on the fact that the Medical Malpractice 
Act identifies in detail the exact legislative purposes for which 
the act was established. Those purposes included considerations 
of the high cost of medical malpractice insurance for doctors and 
the possibility that many doctors would leave practice due to the 
unavailability or the excessively high cost of insurance. In 
response to the legislative purpose, the legislature shortened 
the normal statute of limitations for bringing a negligence act 
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against doctors and provided a four year statute of repose. See 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4(1). 
Unfortunately, the court in Allen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, was not presented with a claim that had never been 
actionable based on the four year statute of repose. Rather, the 
court was faced with a simple factual situation where a plaintiff 
had failed to file her action in spite of the fact she had 
knowledge of the malpractice and accordingly allowed the two year 
statute of limitations to run on her claim. 
Lichtefeld submits that the facts presented in this 
case as they relate to the architects' and builders' statute of 
repose differ substantially from the facts presented in the Allen 
case and accordingly the court should not follow its ruling in 
the Allen case. In this case, Lichtefeld's claim did not even 
surface until after the seven year statute of repose had lapsed. 
Lichtefeld submits that if his claim were for medical malpractice 
that the facts supporting the claim would show that Lichtefeld 
did not become aware of any damages giving rise to a claim for 
negligence against a health care provider until after the four 
year statute of repose had lapsed. Accordingly, the factual 
situation presented in this case differs substantially from the 
factual situation presented in Allen. 
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That is not to say that the court should not follow the 
reasoning as set out in the Allen case. However, substantial 
difficulties arise in applying the Allen case's analysis to this 
matter. In Allen, the court was interpreting the Medical 
Malpractice Act, which contains a complete and concise statement 
of the legislative intent behind the legislation. The court was 
easily able to consider that legislative intent and make a 
decision as to whether the shortening of the statute of 
limitations from the normal statute of limitations for negligence 
claims was rationally related to the intent identified by the 
legislature behind the legislation. 
The legislative intent behind enactment of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-25.5 is not clear. There is no stated 
legislative purpose for enactment of the architects7 and 
builders' statute of repose. Counsel for Lichtefeld has reviewed 
the materials submitted with the Horton briefs, including the 
certified transcripts from the House and Senate hearings when the 
architects' and builders' statute of repose was enacted. 
However, there does not appear to be any concise stated reason 
for enactment of the legislation. The court is left simply to 
attempt to decipher the legislative intent, as courts have done 
in other states when considering the architects' and contractors' 
statutes of repose. 
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The respondents7 argument suggests that in that there 
are more states which have held that the architects7 and 
builders7 statute of repose as constitutional based on equal 
protection grounds than those who have found that the statute was 
unconstitutional that our statute is somehow constitutional. 
Simply stated, if this court were to follow such reasoning, the 
court could never have reached the decision it reached in Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Inc, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985). The greater 
weight of authority, even today, indicates that statutes of 
repose in state enactments concerning products liability are 
constitutional. The court should dispense summarily with 
respondents7 claim that the weight of authority should sway this 
court7s decision in this matter. 
It is clear that there is a split in the decisions 
which have considered this issue. The court is appraised of the 
various cases and Lichtefeld submits that the court is able to 
make its own determination as to which of the decisions are based 
on more sound reasoning. 
Even if the court adopts the respondents7 claims of 
legislative intent behind enactment of the architects7 and 
contractors7 statute of repose, those legislative ends are not 
rationally related to the means legislature has elected to 
satisfy those ends. Consider the stale claims argument advanced 
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by the respondents• The court should keep in mind that it is the 
plaintiff's burden to move forward on any case and the plaintiff 
has the burden of proof. No claim will ever be successful where 
a plaintiff is unable to make a prima facia case. The court's 
decision in Berry, considering the facts of the Berry case is 
important here. The aircraft in Berry had been constructed 
twenty-three years prior to the accident. This court was not at 
all concerned with the amount of time that had passed nor did it 
even address this "stale claim" argument advanced by the 
respondents. 
After reading all the decisions which have come down on 
both sides of the question of constitutionality of architects' 
and builders' statutes of repose based on equal protection 
grounds, the ultimate issue which the court must address is 
whether the distinction or class creation established for 
architects and builders (and surveyors as of 1988) actually 
creates a class separate and distinct from other potential 
defendants. Lichtefeld submits that the distinction is totally 
artificial. To distinguish between somebody who supplies the 
material and the person who installs that material on the 
improvement to real property simply is without merit. After all, 
once a material is delivered to a job site, the supplier losses 
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all control over the installation of that material by the 
contractor. 
It is also apparent that the legislature has failed to 
consider the life expectancy of improvements to real estate when 
it enacted the seven year statute of repose. If improvements to 
real property had a life expectancy of seven years or less, 
Lichtefeld admits that the seven year statute of repose would be 
rationally related to the legislatures' intent. However, the 
fact is that improvements to real property have useful life 
expectancies of many years. Indeed, many structures will survive 
over one hundred years. Considering the life expectancy of the 
improvements to real property, those who design and construct 
such improvements should not be allowed to simply eliminate their 
liability after the passage of several years. 
Based on the above, it is clear that Utah's architects7 
and contractors' statute of repose does not represent a 
legislative enactment that is rationally related to the alleged 
statutory purposes behind enactment of the statute. The most 
recent court which has considered the question, that being the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. Scales, 
which has been cited extensively in Lichtefeld's original brief, 
provides a reasonable model which this court should follow. The 
Alaska court considered all the arguments raised by the 
23 
respondents and rejected the same. The Alaska Court's ruling was 
not based on the right of contribution among tortfeasors as 
alleged in footnote 1 of the respondents' brief at page 14. 
Lichtefeld concedes that the court considered the contribution 
question, but the Alaska court's decision was plainly based on 
the lack of a reasonable relationship between the legislative 
purpose behind the statute of repose and the means the 
legislature elected to implement that purpose. The court 
concluded: 
In our view there is no substantial 
relationship between exempting design 
professionals from liability, shifting 
liability for defective design and 
construction to owners and material suppliers 
and the goal of encouraging construction . . 
. thus, we believe that the statute means are 
not substantially or rationally related to 
the ends. We conclude that [Alaska's 
architects and builders' statute of repose] 
violates the equal protection clause of the 
Alaska Constitution. 
Turner at page 472. 
The means established by the Utah Legislature are not 
rationally or substantially related to the legislative purpose 
behind the architects' and builders' statute of repose. 
Accordingly, this court should find that Utah Code Annotated § 
78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 
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CONCLUSION 
The similarities between the facts presented in this 
case and the law that should be applied greatly parallel the 
Berry case. The court should reach the same conclusion that it 
reached in Berry, that is that the statute of repose contained in 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional in that it 
denies open access to the courts, a right protected by the Utah 
Constitution. Such a ruling by the court necessarily implies 
that the creation of the class of protected defendants in the 
architects7 and builders' repose statute is an arbitrary and 
unreasonable classification, negating any rational basis between 
the purposes of the legislation and the means used to attain 
those ends. Such a finding by the court should result in the 
statute in question being declared unconstitutional on an equal 
protection basis based on Utah and federal law. Each of the 
other independent grounds as asserted by Lichtefeld in his 
original brief provide additional separate grounds upon which 
Judge Rokich's decision should be reversed. Clearly, the basis 
upon which Judge Rokich made his ruling, that being this court's 
decision in Good v. Christensen is without merit considering this 
court's ruling in Berry. Accordingly, Lichtefeld respectfully 
requests reversal of the trial court's order granting dismissal 
of his claims. 
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ADDENDUM 
Appellant, Cal Gas Corporation ("Cal Gas"), by and through 
its counsel of record, Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, submits 
this Reply Brief concerning the following issues certified to this 
Court by the Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge, 
for the District of Utah. 
Does the Utah architects' and builders' statute of repose, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953), violate Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution? 
IS?VE NO- ? 
Does the Utah architects' and builders' statute of repose 
violate Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution? 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES 
THE OPEN COURT PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
A. The architects' and builders' statute of repose does not pro-
vide a person injured by reason of an architects' or builders' 
negligence with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy. 
As this Court concluded in its decision in Berrv v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (1985), the open courts provision of 
the Utah Constitution allows legislative abrogation of a right of 
action only if the law: 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law" for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the substi-
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tute must be substantially equal in value or 
other benefit to the remedy abrogated in pro-
viding essentially comparable substantive pro-
tection to one's person, property or reputation, 
although the form of the substitute remedy may 
be different* 
jd. at 680. 
It is clear from the context of the Berrv v. Beech Air-
craft decision that the alternative remedies contemplated by this 
Court include remedies similar to that provided by the Worker's 
Compensation Act. See Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra. at 676 -
680 and footnote 3. Under the Worker's Compensation Act, an injured 
employee need not show fault in order to obtain compensation from 
the employer and the employer is liable only for statutorily deline-
ated compensation and cannot be sued civilly. Thus, injured em-
ployees' alternative remedies are against their employers rather 
than third persons. 
By contrast, Buehner Concrete argues that the Legisla-
ture's abrogation of rights of action against designers, planners 
and constructors of improvements to real property seven years after 
the improvement is completed is proper because injured persons 
have an alternative remedy in that they can sue the manufacturers 
of the component parts of the improvement or the landowner. 
Anyone can sue anyone. Establishing liability, however, 
is another matter. According to Buehner Concrete, since the statuti 
of repose does not categorically preclude an injured person from 
- 2 -
suing, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution is satis-
fied. 
The mere right to sue, standing alone, can hardly be 
equated with an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy by 
due course of law" in accordance with the meaning attached to that 
phrase by this court in the Berry v. Beech Aircraft decision. There 
is no remedy if there is no liability, and the law discourages 
injured persons from suing defendants who have no liability. See 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1981). 
The standard of care imposed by Utah law upon persons 
involved in the design, construction or control of improvements 
to real property varies depending upon the status of those persons. 
An owner of land owes an invitee the duty to conduct reasonable 
inspections to find hidden dangers and of correcting those hidden 
dangers. Cannon v. Oviatt. 520 P.2d 883 (1974); Stevens v. Salt 
Lake County. 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). By definition, 
therefore, if the defect is hidden but not discoverable by a reason-
able inspection, the landowner is not liable. Stevens v. Colorado 
Fuel and Iron. 24 Utah 2d 214 469 P.2d 3 (1970). 
In this case, plaintiffs and Cal Gas contend that Buehner 
Concrete was negligent in failing to properly connect the structural 
members of the building. These defective connections were designed 
in accordance with complex engineering criteria and were covered 
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by interior walls. Obviously, these defects were hidden and no 
reasonable owner could discover them. If these latent defects 
caused plaintiffs' injuries, the owner of the Goldminer's Daughter 
Lodge would not be liable under Utah law and plaintiffs will be 
left without a remedy. 
Buehner Concrete also suggests that an injured person 
has an alternative remedy against the manufacturer of the component 
parts comprising the improvement to real property. Aside from 
the fact that Senator Buckner's comments during the senate hearings 
on the statute of repose bill indicate that he intended the statute 
of repose to apply to the suppliers of component parts, a possible 
suit against such a supplier is not an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy within the meaning of the Berrv v. Beech Aircraft 
decision. 
Every improvement to real property is nothing more than 
component parts connected together. Whether it be the cement used 
to cast the footings, foundations or walls, the components of the 
plumbing or the electrical system, or the paint on the walls, an 
improvement to real property is merely an amalgamation of component 
parts or products. The manufacturers of these component parts 
are liable for their negligence or for any dangerous defects in 
the products. See Hahn v. Armco Steel Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979). That liability runs for four years after the injury is 
incurred. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra; Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-12-25 (1953). 
Two defenses can be asserted by a component manufacturer: 
(1) misuse of the product; or (2) knowledge of the defect by the 
user.of the product. Hahn v. Armco Steel, supra at 158. Thus, 
if the architect or builder was negligent in installing or applying 
a component, the manufacturer of that component would not be liable 
for the architect's or builder's negligence and persons injured by 
reason of that negligence would be left without a remedy. 
It is an inescapable conclusion that Buehner Concrete's 
argument that the Legislature implicitly provided injured persons 
with an alternative remedy when it enacted the architects' and 
builders' statute of repose because it did not eliminate all possi-
ble causes of action is without merit. That argument ignores the 
fundamental policy of the law that the person liable for the injury 
should pay for the injury. If Buehner Concrete's position were 
adopted, injured persons would be left without a remedy or encour-
aged to bring a nonmeritorious action against an innocent landowner 
or component manufacturer. Without question, these options are not 
effective and reasonable alternative remedies within the meaning 
of this Court's decision in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 
B. The architects' and builders' statute of repose is an unrea-
sonable and arbitrary means of eradicating illusory economic 
evils. 
If a reasonable and effective alternative remedy is not 
provided, the Legislature may abrogate a remedy only if there is 
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a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination 
of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means for achieving the objective. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra 
at 680. 
Other than a few stray comments by representatives or 
senators during the hearings on the statute of repose bill address-
ing the problem of a "sue conscious" society and the possibility 
that deceased or retired architects or builders might be sued, 
there is nothing to indicate the economic or social evils that 
the statute of repose was enacted to eliminate. There is no evi-
dence that the Utah Legislature was presented with any facts demon-
strating a social or economic evil or that the Utah legislature 
was reacting to a Utah Supreme Court decision affirming an unjust 
result against an architect or builder. To fill this void, Buehner 
Concrete has compiled a list of purported economic evils that might 
have motivated the Utah legislature to enact the statute of repose. 
These economic evils have been extracted from the comments of repre-
sentatives or senators in the hearings on the statute or repose 
bill or from decisions from other jurisdictions upholding the con-
stitutionality of their statutes of repose. Those possible economic 
evils are: 
1. The broad scope of liability imposed upon builders 
and architects; 
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2. Suits against builders or architects based upon 
the neglect, improper modification or unskilled repair of 
the improvement by the owner; 
3. The 2.1% of suits that are filed against architects 
or builders more than seven years after the improvement is 
completed; 
4. Builders' and architects' liability that parallels 
the life of the improvements; 
5. The substantial burden of proof imposed upon archi-
tects and builders in order to defend stale claims asserted 
against them; and 
6. The stifling of innovation and experimentation of 
architects and builders. 
As will be demonstrated below, those courts and legisla-
tors, in identifying the economic evils to be eliminated by archi-
tects' and builders' statutes of repose, ignored fundamental legal 
principles and, as stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft: 
Have all but read [state constitutional open 
courts or remedies provisions] out of their 
respective constitutions, at least insofar as 
they provide substantive, as opposed to pro-
cedural protections. 
Id. at 678. 
Giving the courts and legislators quoted by Buehner Con-
crete every benefit of the doubt, it is clear that they were opera-
ting under the following misconception: 
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Innocent architects and builders are being 
sued many years after the improvement is com-
pleted and forced to prove their innocence 
with stale evidence. 
It is interesting to note that the courts and legislators 
quoted by Buehner Concrete were oblivious to factors such as the 
legitimacy or the seriousness of a plaintiff's injuries, as well 
as the negligence of the architect or builder. Rather, the exclu-
sive focus of those courts and legislators was on the burden placed 
upon architects or builders by requiring them to defend. Even 
more important, however, those courts and legislators totally 
ignored the following well-defined legal principles in reaching 
their conclusions. 
1. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1981) sanction plaintiffs who bring 
nonmeritorious actions; 
2. The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to 
establish an architects' or builders' liability by a prepon-
derance of the evidence; 
3. Architects and builders are only answerable for 
their own negligence; 
4. Architects and builders are only obligated to perform 
in accordance with the standard of care at the time the im-
provement was designed or constructed; and 
5. The injured person must not only prove the standard 
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of care at the time the improvement was designed or construct-
ed, but also must prove a breach of that standard of care. 
Moreover, those courts upholding the constitutionality 
of a.statute of repose under an open courts provision similar to 
Utah's, and the Utah legislators in enacting the statute of repose, 
failed to consider the constitutional rights of persons injured 
by the negligent acts of an architect or builder. According to 
this Court: 
The basic purpose of Article I, Section 11 is 
to impose some limitation on [the legislative 
power] for the benefit of those persons who 
are injured in their persons, property or repu-
tations, since they are generally isolated in 
society, belong to no identifiable group, and 
rarely are able to rally the political process 
to their aid. 
Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, s^pra at 676. 
This Court's appreciation of the trainers' intent in enact-
ing Article I Section 11 is reminiscent of footnote 4 in the United 
States v, Carolene Products Co., in which Justice Stone suggested 
a stricter standard of review for laws which manifest prejudice 
against discreet and insular groups as follows: 
Prejudice against discreet and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry. 
304 U.S. 144, (1938). 
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Potential tort plaintiffs cannot even identify as a group. 
As a result, when pressured by special interest groups such as 
products manufacturers or architects and builders, the majoritarian 
political process rarely is presented with, or takes into account, 
the impact of proposed legislation on potential tort plaintiffs. 
By way of illustration, all of the policy reasons identi-
fied by Buehner Concrete supporting enactment of the statute of 
repose militate even more strongly in favor of a hypothetical 
statute holding builders and architects strictly liable for injuries 
caused by an improvement after the passage of seven years from 
completion of the improvement. After all, the law imposes upon 
the injured person the burden of proving not only the standard of 
care, but also a breach of the standard of care. Thus, it is the 
injured person who is most seriously affected by evolving building 
codes, lost architectural plans and faded memories. In addition, 
since 97.9% of all claims are brought within seven years, the 
liability imposed upon the building industry by the hypothetical 
statute would be minimal and easily spread throughout the industry. 
It is clear that the architects7 and builders' statute 
of repose is the result of a focused effort by an organized industry 
to shield itself from its own negligence at the expense of isolated 
persons injured by that negligence. 
Thus, this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft acknowledged 
the mandate of the framers of the Utah Constitution and formulated 
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a two-prong test that rationally balanced the power of the Legis-
lature against the rights of injured persons to a remedy. All 
that is asked by persons injured by the negligence of an architect 
or builder, and all that the Utah constitution requires, is that 
those injured persons be allowed to attempt to prove, within the 
requirements of the law, that the architect or builder was negligent 
and, if successful, to recover compensation for their injuries. 
The law does not allow, nor do injured persons seek, star chamber 
justice whereby innocent architects or builders are forced to prove 
their innocence with stale evidence. 
Referring specifically to the six economic evils that 
Buehner argues the statute of repose might have been enacted to 
eliminate, some require more discussion than others. However, as 
discussed above, those imagined evils are insignificant when weighed 
against the problems faced by an injured person who must live with 
substantial uncompensated disabilities as a result of an architect's 
or builder's negligence. Each possible economic evil will be dis-
cussed separately below. 
1. Builders and architects are subject to a broad scope 
of liability that requires limitation. Buehner Concrete cites 
several decisions in which architects and builders statutes of 
repose have been held to be constitutional on the basis that archi-
tects and builders are subjected to a broad scope of liability 
that requires limitation. 
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Specifically, Buehner Concrete quotes from an opinion 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wherein that Court stated that 
since architects and builders may be liable to both landowners 
and to others who use the land, while owners are only liable to 
those who use the land, it is manifestly rational to enact a statute 
of repose. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co,, 382 A.2d 
715 (Pa. 1976). 
Such distinctions are not difficult to draw. The scope 
of liability imposed upon all persons is limited by the concept 
of foreseeability. For example, when the concept of foreseeability 
is applied to physicians, the scope of liability is limited to 
the patient being treated. Product manufacturers are subjected 
to perhaps the broadest scope of liability because of the mobility 
of their products. If an airliner is defective and falls from 
the sky, the manufacturer is liable to the owner, the crew, the 
passengers and all persons killed or injured on the ground, whether 
they be farmers in Kansas or stockbrokers in New York. The manu-
facturer is also liable for property damage caused by the defective 
airliner. 
Thus, to eliminate architects' and builders' liability 
for their negligence after seven years has no rational relationship 
to the purported scope of liability imposed upon them. Further, 
even if the broad scope of liability constituted an economic evil, 
a seven year repose period is an arbitrary and unreasonable means 
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of achieving the elimination of that evil since an injured persons 
right to compensation may be lost based solely on how soon the 
person is injured after the improvement is completed. 
It follows that the scope of liability imposed upon archi-
tects and builders is an illusory economic evil and the statute 
of repose is an unreasonable and arbitrary means of eliminating 
that economic evil even if it did exist. 
2. Negligence bv the owner. Buehner Concrete argues 
that the statute of repose reasonably eliminates the evil of sub-
jecting architects and engineers to liability for injuries caused 
by the negligence, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper 
modification or unskilled repair by the owner after the construction 
of the improvement is complete. In other words, if there is a 
possibility that an architect or builder may have a defense based 
upon the negligence of the owner, the architect or builder should 
not be sued. 
Clearly, making persons defend actions in which they 
have defenses is hardly an economic or social evil to be eliminated. 
In fact, the contrary is true. If the mere filing of an answer 
which asserted defenses was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's 
claim, the failure of the system of justice to compensate plain-
tiff's with legitimate contract or tort claims would constitute 
an economic evil. 
In addition, even if the fact that architects or builders 
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with possible defenses are forced to litigate constituted an eco-
nomic evil, the use of a seven year period is unreasonable and 
arbitrary. It has absolutely nothing to do with the supposed eco-
nomic evil and discriminates among injured persons depending upon 
when they are injured. 
3. Since 97.9% of all suits against architects or build-
ers are brought within seven years after the improvement is com-
pleted, it is reasonable to cut-off legitimate claims after that 
point. If only 2.1% of the claims against negligent architects 
or builders are brought more than seven years after the improvement 
is completed, the actual number of architects or builders that 
are subject to such suits is minuscule. 
In addition, once a suit is brought, it is the injured 
person that must prove the standard of care at the time the improve 
ment was designed or constructed and a breach of that standard of 
care. Thus, the passage of time is more detrimental to a plain-
tiff's case in chief that it is to an architect's or builder's 
defense. 
It is the stark contrast between the 2.1% of injured 
persons with legitimate claims against a negligent architect or 
builder and negligent architects or builders who must defend and 
pay compensation that eviscerates this supposed policy supporting 
the Legislature's enactment of the statute of repose. 
- 14 -
4. Because buildings mav last hundreds of years, repose 
is needed to eliminate perpetual liability. This purported policy 
reason supporting the enactment of the statute of repose is contra-
dictory to the policy of the law set forth by this Court in Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft. In that case, the product liability statute 
of repose was struck down as arbitrary and unreasonable on the 
basis, among others, that "the statute does not even purport 
to approximate an average expected life of the products covered 
. . . " I£. at 681. 
If improvements to real property are expected to last 
100 years, it is the duty of the designer or builder of that im-
provement to exercise reasonable care to assure that the improvement 
is safe for 100 years. If an architect or builder is only liable 
for seven years, there is less incentive to build safe buildings 
resulting in an increase in the number of persons killed or injured 
by shoddy design or workmanship. Like the products liability sta-
tute of repose, the architects' and builders' statute of repose 
"may well be counterproductive to public safety." id. at 683. 
5. The statute of repose is reasonably calculated to 
eliminate the substantial burden of proof imposed upon architects 
and builders in order to defend stale claims asserted against them. 
This point is a common thread running through all of Buehner Con-
crete's possible policy reasons supporting the enactment of the 
statute of repose. As such, it has been discussed above and Cal 
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Gas will simply reiterate that the injured plaintiff must prove 
the standard of care, its breach and causation before a negligent 
architect or builder is liable. Faded memories, evolving stan-
dards of care or lost documents increase the plaintiff's burden 
much more than they decrease a negligent architect's or builder's 
ability to defend. 
6. The statute of repose encourages innovation and 
experimentation of architects and builders. Finally, Buehner Con-
crete argues that without a statute of repose innovation and experi-
mentation by architects and builders would be stifled. Fortunately, 
this statement is correct. If innovation and experimentation in 
the design or construction of improvements meets accepted industry 
practices, the architect or builder will not be liable. On the 
other hand, if the innovation and experimentation does not meet 
accepted industry practices, it should be discouraged. 
Statutes of repose, such as the architects' and builders' 
statute of repose, should not be enacted to encourage professionals 
or products manufacturers to exceed the bounds of accepted standards 
of care or industry practices. If an experiment or innovation, not 
in accord with the standard of care, fails and injures an innocent 
person who had no say in the innovative or experimental design or 
construction, the architect or builder should be liable and should 
not be shielded from the liability by a statute of repose. 
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In addition, the Uniform Building Code which governs 
the design and construction of improvements to real property is 
updated, revised and supplemented each year. As the Preface to 
that .Code states: 
The Uniform Building Code is dedicated to the 
development of better building construction 
and greater safety to the public by uniformity 
in building laws. The code is founded on broad-
based performance principles that make possible 
the use of new materials and new construction 
systems. 
• • • • 
Changes to the code are processed each year 
and published in supplements in a form per-
mitting ready adoption by local communities. 
These changes are carefully reviewed in public 
hearings by professional experts in the field 
of building construction and fire and life 
safety. 
Uniform Building Code. Preface (1985 ed.) (Attached as Appendix 
"A") . 
Since design and construction innovation, after being 
tested and approved by the building industry, are incorporated into 
the Uniform Building Code on a yearly basis, an architect or builder 
can apply those innovations in accordance with industry standards 
and, if those innovations cause injury, the architect or builder 
would not be liable. 
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